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Abstract. In this paper we analyze the case of two firms A and B, each competing with the other 
under conditions of incomplete information. Thre analysed cases are: company A assume one of the 
following roles: either ignore the firm B or leading production or leading price acting as if B knows 
its intention and firm B acts either ignoring company A, or as satellite of production or satellite of 
price acting as if A knows its intention. 
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1. Introduction 
The duopoly is a market situation where there are two suppliers of a good 
unsubstituted and a sufficient number of consumers. 
Considering below, two competitors A and B which produce the same normal 
good, we propose analyzing their activity in response to the work of each other 
company. 
Each of them, when it set the production level and the selling price will cover the 
production and price of the other company. If one of the two firms will set price or 
quantity produced first, the other adjusting for it, it will be called price leader or 
leader of production respectively, the second company called the satellite price, or 
satellite production respectively. 
The approach of the following considerations will be that company A will assume 
a role: either ignore the firm B or leading production or leading price acting as if B 
knows its intention and firm B acts either ignoring company A, or as satellite of 
production or satellite of price acting as if A knows its intention. 
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Let therefore two producers, the demand inverse function: p(Q)=a-bQ, a,b0, total 
costs of A and B being TCA(Q)=Q+, TCB(Q)=Q+, ,,,0 where Q is the 
production. We have now: MCA= and MCB= - marginal costs of each firm. 
 
2. The Case of Cournot Equilibrium 
In this case, both companies A and B act independently of each other and at the 
same time. 
Considering the profits of both firms, we have: 
     AABAAA QQQQba)Q( =    AB
2
A QbQabQ  
     BBBABB QQQQba)Q( =    BA
2
B QbQabQ  
In order to maximize the profits, we must have: 



A
AA
Q
)Q(
0bQabQ2 BA   



B
BB
Q
)Q(
0bQabQ2 AB   
from where (noting with C from Cournot): 
b3
2a
Q )C(A

 , 
b3
2a
Q )C(B

  
The price will be: 
 )C(B)C(A)C( QQp  =  )C(B)C(A QQba  =
3
a 
 
and the profits: 
 )C(A)C(A Q =    )C(A)C(B2)C(A QbQabQ =   
b9
2a
2
 
 )C(B)C(B Q =    )C(B)C(A2)C(B QbQabQ =   
b9
2a
2
 
We have now (noting    )C(B)C(B)C(A)C(A)C( QQD   - the difference between two 
profits): 
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)C(D  )C(A)C(A Q -  )C(B)C(B Q =    
b3
a2
 
 
3. The Case of Stackelberg Production Leader and Satellite in Terms of 
Production 
In this case, the company A assumes the role of production leader and company B 
recognizes this. 
Because the company A is a leader of production, it will produce QA units of a 
good. The company B will adjust production after A, in response to its leadership, 
producing QB=f(QA) units of good (f - the reaction function). Because the selling 
price depends on the total quantity of products reached the market, we have 
p=p(QA+QB) – the price per unit of good. 
On the other hand, the company A must establish a level of production depending 
on the reaction of firm B, because it will determine through the production realized 
the selling price of the product. Similarly, the company B will adjust its production 
levels according to A, because at a higher or lower level, the price will change and 
therefore profit of the company ([1]). 
Let therefore, the profit of the production leader: 
     AABAAA QQQQba)Q( =    AB
2
A QbQabQ  
Since QB=f(QA) we have: 
 )Q( AA     AA
2
A QQbfabQ  
Consider also the profit of the satellite: 
     BBBABB QQQQba)Q( =    BA
2
B QbQabQ  
The extreme condition for the profit of B is: 
0bQabQ2
Q
)Q(
AB
B
BB 

  
therefore: 
 
2
Q
b2
a
QfQ AAB 

  
Now the profit of A will become: 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                     Vol 12, no 5, 2016 
 8 
)Q( AA = 

 A
2
A Q
2
2a
2
bQ
 
and the condition for maximizing: 
A
AA
Q
)Q(

 = 0
2
2a
bQA 

  
therefore (noting with PL from production leader): 
b2
2a
Q )PL(A

 , 
)PL(
BQ =  )PL(AQf =
b4
32a 
 
and the price will be: 
 )PL(B)PL(A)PL( QQp  =  )PL(B)PL(A QQba  =
4
2a 
 
The profits of both firms A and B are: 
 )PL(A)PL(A Q =    )PL(A)PL(B2)PL(A QbQabQ =   
b8
2a
2
 
respectively: 
 )PL(B)PL(B Q =    )PL(B)PL(A2)PL(B QbQabQ =   
b16
32a
2
 
Because A assumes that it is leader of production, we must have: 
)PL(
AQ 
)PL(
BQ  
that is: 
b4
32a
b2
2a 


   56a . 
We have now (noting    )PL(B)PL(B)PL(A)PL(A)PL( QQD   - the difference between 
two profits): 
)PL(D  )PL(A)PL(A Q -  )PL(B)PL(B Q =   
b16
744a562a 222
 
 
4. The Case of Stackelberg Price Leader and Satellite in Terms of Price 
In this case, the company A assumes the role of price leader and company B 
recognizes this. 
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It is obvious that, regardless of the satellite firm behavior, the final sale price will 
be the same for the two companies, otherwise the demand being moving to the 
company with the lowest price. 
Let the price being p0 – fixed in the final. 
The profit functions of the two companies are therefore: 
     AAAAA QpQpQ)Q(  
     BBBBB QpQpQ)Q(  
From these formulas we have the necessary condition that p, p (otherwise 
)Q( AA 0 or )Q( BB 0). 
Because both profit functions are of first degree in Q and p-0, p-0 they reach 
the maximum at infinity. 
In this case (with linear total cost of B) the production of B will be, for the 
moment, indeterminate, let say QB=q0. 
Meanwhile, the company leadership is aware that setting a selling price p will lead 
a production QB of the satellite firm, so in terms of a demand curve Q=Q(p) its 
offer will be restricted to QA(p)=Q-QB=Q(p)-q= q
b
pa


= p
b
1
b
bqa


. Because 
QA(p)0 we must have: 
b
pa
q

 . If 
b
pa
q

  the production of A: QA(p)0, 
therefore A gives up at the price leader role. 
Its profit function becomes: 
     pQp)p( AA =   







 p
b
1
b
bqa
p =
 
b
bbqa
p
b
bqa
p
b
1 2 

  
The profit maximization condition of A is therefore: 
0
b
bqa
p
b
2
p
)p(A 




 
from where (noting with PP from production price): 
2
bqa
p )PP(

  
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From this relation, because 
b
pa
q
)PP(
  we have 
2
bqa
p )PP(

 
2
b
pa
ba
)PP(



= 
2
p )PP( 
 that is: 
)PP(p  which satisfies the initial condition 
on the price. 
Finally: 
b2
bqa
p
b
1
b
bqa
Q )PP()PP(A



 , qQ
)PP(
B   
The profits of both firms A and B are: 
 )PP(A)PP(A Q =    )PP(A)PP( Qp =   
b4
bqa
2
 
respectively: 
 )PP(B)PP(B Q =  q)PP(B =    )PP(B)PP( Qp =
 
b8
b82a
b2
2a
q
2
b
22






 
  
Because 
)PP(
B  is a second degree function in q we have now the following cases: 
    b82a 2  implies that  q)PP(B 0 qR therefore the company B 
will lose, therefore it not accept the role of price satellite 
    b82a 2  implies that the maximum of the profit of B will be 
 q)PP(B =0 for q=
b2
2a 
 
    b82a 2  implies that )PP(B  has two real roots q1, q2R. Because 
q1q2=
b
2
0 we have that q1,q20 or q1,q20. If q1,q20  2a 0, the 
parabola having negative dominant coefficient, we find that for q0:  q)PP(B
0. 
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If q1,q20  2a 0 the maximum of the second degree function is 
reached for: q=
b2
2a 
 and is  )PP(B)PP(B Q =   
b8
2a
2
. 
Also, in this case:  )PP(A)PP(A Q =   
b16
23a
2
 and it must satisfy also: 
   b1623a 2  
The productions will be: 
b4
23a
Q )PP(A

 , 
b2
2a
Q )PP(B

  and the price: 
4
2a
p )PP(

 . 
Like a conclusion, for B in order to recognize a role of price leader to A and also A 
to assume this role, they must satisfy the conditions: 
    b82a 2  
  2a 0 
  23a 0 
    b1623a 2  
We have now (noting    )PP(B)PP(B)PP(A)PP(A)PP( QQD   - the difference between 
two profits): 
)PP(D  )PP(A)PP(A Q -  )PP(B)PP(B Q =   
b16
447a652a 222
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5. The Case When A Ignores B, but B Considers A as Production 
Leader 
In this case from sections 2 and 3, we have (noting with C,PL from Cournot and 
production leader): 
b3
2a
Q )PL,C(A

 , 
)PL,C(
BQ =
b4
32a 
 
The real price will be: 
 )PL,C(B)PL,C(A)PL,C( QQp  =  )PL,C(B)PL,C(A QQba  =
12
52a5 
 
and the profits: 
 )PL,C(A)PL,C(A Q =    )PL,C(A)PL,C(B2)PL,C(A QbQabQ =
 


b36
2a5
2
 
respectively: 
 )PL,C(B)PL,C(B Q =    )PL,C(B)PL,C(A2)PL,C(B QbQabQ =
  


b48
72a532a
 
We have now (noting    )PL,C(B)PL,C(B)PL,C(A)PL,C(A)PL,C( QQD   - the difference 
between two profits): 
)PL,C(D  )PL,C(A)PL,C(A Q -  )PL,C(B)PL,C(B Q =
 


b144
432068a53582a5 222
 
 
6. The Case when A Ignores B, but B Considers A as Price Leader 
In this case from sections 2 and 4 we have (noting with C,PP from Cournot and 
production price): 
b3
2a
Q )PP,C(A

 , 
b4
32a
Q )PP,C(B

  
The real price will be: 
 )PP,C(B)PP,C(A)PP,C( QQp  =  )PP,C(B)PP,C(A QQba  =
6
4a 
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and the profits: 
 )PP,C(A)PP,C(A Q =    )PP,C(A)PP,C(B2)PP,C(A QbQabQ =
  


b18
2a45a
 
respectively: 
 )PP,C(B)PP,C(B Q =    )PP,C(B)PP,C(A2)PP,C(B QbQabQ =
 


b12
2a
2
 
We have now (noting    )PP,C(B)PP,C(B)PP,C(A)PP,C(A)PP,C( QQD   - the difference 
between two profits): 
)PP,C(D  )PP,C(A)PP,C(A Q -  )PP,C(B)PP,C(B Q =
 


b36
41417a11102a 222
 
 
7. The Case when A is A Production Leader, but B Ignores A 
In this case from section 2 and 3 we have (noting with PL,C from production leader 
and Cournot): 
b2
2a
Q )C,PL(A

 , 
b3
2a
Q )C,PL(B

  
The real price will be: 
 )C,PL(B)C,PL(A)C,PL( QQp  =  )C,PL(B)C,PL(A QQba  =
6
4a 
 
and the profits: 
 )C,PL(A)C,PL(A Q =    )C,PL(A)C,PL(B2)C,PL(A QbQabQ =
 


b12
2a
2
 
respectively: 
 )C,PL(B)C,PL(B Q =    )C,PL(B)C,PL(A2)C,PL(B QbQabQ =
  


b18
2a54a
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We have now (noting    )C,PL(B)C,PL(B)C,PL(A)C,PL(A)C,PL( QQD   - the difference 
between two profits): 
)C,PL(D  )C,PL(A)C,PL(A Q -  )C,PL(B)C,PL(B Q =
 


b36
17144a10112a 222
 
 
8. The Case when A is a Production Leader, but B Considers A as Price 
Leader 
In this case from section 2, we have (noting with PL,PP from production leader and 
production price): 
b2
2a
Q )PP,PL(A

 , 
b2
2a
Q )PP,PL(B

  
The real price will be: 
 )PP,PL(B)PP,PL(A)PP,PL( QQp  =  )PP,PL(B)PP,PL(A QQba  =
2

 
and the profits: 
 )PP,PL(A)PP,PL(A Q =    )PP,PL(A)PP,PL(B2)PP,PL(A QbQabQ = 

2
 
respectively: 
 )PP,PL(B)PP,PL(B Q =    )PP,PL(B)PP,PL(A2)PP,PL(B QbQabQ = 

2
 
We have now (noting    )PP,PL(B)PP,PL(B)PP,PL(A)PP,PL(A)PP,PL( QQD   - the 
difference between two profits): 
)PP,PL(D  )PP,PL(A)PP,PL(A Q -  )PP,PL(B)PP,PL(B Q =   
 
9. The Case when A is a Price Leader, but B Ignores A 
In this case from section 2, we have (noting with PP,C from production price and 
Cournot): 
b4
23a
Q )C,PP(A

 , 
b3
2a
Q )C,PP(B

  
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The real price will be: 
 )C,PP(B)C,PP(A)C,PP( QQp  =  )C,PP(B)C,PP(A QQba  =
12
25a5 
 
and the profits: 
 )C,PP(A)C,PP(A Q =    )C,PP(A)C,PP(B2)C,PP(A QbQabQ =
  


b48
23a27a5
 
respectively: 
 )C,PP(B)C,PP(B Q =    )C,PP(B)C,PP(A2)C,PP(B QbQabQ =
 


b36
2a5
2
 
We have now (noting    )C,PP(B)C,PP(B)C,PP(A)C,PP(A)C,PP( QQD   - the difference 
between two profits): 
)C,PP(D  )C,PP(A)C,PP(A Q -  )C,PP(B)C,PP(B Q =
 


b144
682043a58532a5 222
 
 
10. The Case When A is A Price Leader, but B Considers A as 
Production Leader 
In this case from section 2, we have (noting with PP,PL from production price and 
production leader): 
b4
23a
Q )PL,PP(A

 , )PL,PP(BQ =
b4
32a 
 
The real price will be: 
 )PL,PP(B)PL,PP(A)PL,PP( QQp  =  )PL,PP(B)PL,PP(A QQba  =
4
a2 
 
and the profits: 
 )PL,PP(A)PL,PP(A Q =    )PL,PP(A)PL,PP(B2)PL,PP(A QbQabQ =
  


b16
23a3a2
 
respectively: 
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 )PL,PP(B)PL,PP(B Q =    )PL,PP(B)PL,PP(A2)PL,PP(B QbQabQ =
  


b16
32a3a2
 
We have now (noting    )PL,PP(B)PL,PP(B)PL,PP(A)PL,PP(A)PL,PP( QQD   - the 
difference between two profits): 
)PL,PP(D  )PL,PP(A)PL,PP(A Q -  )PL,PP(B)PL,PP(B Q =
  


b16
a27
 
 
11. Theory of Games in the Case of Duopoly 
Of the above, we have nine cases representing the situation in which are the two 
companies. The question is the decision of each of them not knowing the 
competitor‘s decision, in order to obtain a great difference of the profits. 
Let therefore, the following zero sum game: 
Table 1 
A/B Cournot 
production 
satellite 
price satellite min 
Cournot )C(D  )PL,C(D  )PP,C(D  
v1=
 )PP,C()PL,C()C( D,D,Dmin
 
productio
n leader 
)C,PL(D  )PL(D  )PP,PL(D  
v2=
 )PP,PL()PL()C,PL( D,D,Dmin
 
price 
leader 
)C,PP(D  )PL,PP(D  )PP(D  
v3=
 )PP()PL,PP()C,PP( D,D,Dmin
 
max 
w1=












)C,PP(
)C,PL(
)C(
D
,D
,D
max
 
w2=












)PL,PP(
)PL(
)PL,C(
D
,D
,D
max
 
w3=












)PP(
)PP,PL(
)PP,C(
D
,D
,D
max
 
W=min {w1,w2,w3} 
/max {v1.v2,v3}=V 
Applying the Wald criterion we obtain the best choice of A corresponding to the 
value V and the best choice of B corresponding to the value W. 
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Example 
Let two producers, the demand inverse function: p(Q)=100-Q, total costs of A and 
B being TCA(Q)=Q+, TCB(Q)=Q+, ,,0 where Q is the production. 
We have the following game: 
Table 2 
A/B Cournot production satellite price satellite min 
Cournot 
  
3
19010 
 
 
4
4825290 
 10065
16
7 2   v1 
productio
n leader 
 
36
37925295017 
 
 
36
11600214017 
 
 
9
7075515 
 v2 
price 
leader 
10  
9
3700
9
650
144
43 2   
  
16
190107 
 
v3 
max w1 w2 w3 W / V 
Using the computer for simulating in the cases: =10, [0,20] with step 1 we 
obtain: 
 =0 - A – Cournot – V=322.2, B – price satellite – W=322.2 
 =1 - A – Cournot – V=263.3, B – price satellite – W=263.3 
 =2 - A – Cournot – V=205.2, B – price satellite – W=205.2 
 =3 - A – Cournot – V=148.1, B – price satellite – W=148.1 
 =4 - A – Cournot – V=92, B – price satellite – W=92 
 =5 - A – Cournot – V=36.81, B – price satellite – W=36.81 
 =6 - A – production leader – V=4, B – price satellite – W=4 
 =7 - A – production leader – V=3, B – price satellite – W=3 
 =8 - A – production leader – V=2, B – price satellite – W=2 
 =9 - A – production leader – V=1, B – price satellite – W=1 
 =10 - A – production leader – V=0, B – price satellite – W=0 
 =11 - A – production leader – V=-1, B – price satellite – W=-1 
 =12 - A – production leader – V=-2, B – price satellite – W=-2 
 =13 - A – production leader – V=-3, B – price satellite – W=-3 
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 =14 - A – production leader – V=-4, B – price satellite – W=-4 
 =15 - A – production leader – V=-47.22, B – Cournot – W=-47.22 
 =16 - A – production leader – V=-101, B – Cournot – W=-101 
 =17 - A – production leader – V=-154.6, B – Cournot – W=-154.6 
 =18 - A – production leader – V=-207.9, B – Cournot – W=-207.9 
 =19 - A – production leader – V=-261, B – Cournot – W=-261 
 =20 - A – production leader – V=-313.9, B – Cournot – W=-313.9 
We can see that for a marginal price of A it will have an advantage in front of B, 
but in order to have a maximal difference it must ignore for 5 what B will do 
and for 6 it will adopt a position of production leader. For 10, because its 
marginal cost is greater than that of B it will lose but in order to minimize the 
difference between it and B it must adopt also the position of production leader. 
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